African Coups: Unraveling the Efficacy of AU and Regional Sanctions Amidst Resurgence

The African political landscape continues to be marked by a troubling pattern of unconstitutional power shifts, defying the African Union (AU) and regional economic communities’ efforts to maintain democratic governance through sanctions and membership suspensions.

Despite an active stance against non-democratic transitions, including military coups, the AU's record since 2019 shows an alarming uptick in such events. This resurgence points to important questions regarding the genuine effectiveness of the sanctions in place and the consistent application of policies designed to discourage governments from deviating from democratic norms.

From 2019 to 2023, the AU suspended the participants of coups in several member states, following a documented strategy to enforce its constitutive acts. Regional blocs, notably the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) and the Economic Community of Central African States (Eccas), mirrored these steps with sanctions of their own. Ecowas moved beyond suspension, imposing economic sanctions on countries like Mali, Guinea, and Burkina Faso to coerce a return to constitutional order.

Historically, from the 1960s to 2019, the AU and its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), boasted a downward trend in coup incidences, which can be partially attributed to a zero-tolerance policy. This level of success, however, is currently being challenged, with the average number of coups ballooning to 1.8 per year by 2023. Repeated coups in countries such as Sudan, Mali, and Burkina Faso underscore the lack of deterrence from the imposed sanctions.

Inconsistencies in the AU’s application of sanctions have become evident. While quick to suspend Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Gabon, the AU hesitated with Niger and adopted an unconventional response to Chad's power change, leading to perceptions of double standards and diminishing its authority. Moreover, certain constitutional manipulations in various African countries have not been addressed with the same rigor, if at all—a point of contention as it relates to the AU’s own framework on unconstitutional changes of government as outlined in the 2009 Ezulwini Framework.

These inconsistencies and the selective application of punitive measures have eroded the integrity of the AU’s sanctions regime. Coupled with the adverse impacts of economic sanctions on ordinary citizens, which often translate to domestic support for coup leaders opposed to regional interventions, sanctions may be losing their intended effect.

The AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) is therefore under pressure to apply a more consistent, equitable, and effective approach to sanctions. The full implementation of the Ezulwini Framework and an active sanctions sub-committee are essential steps in ensuring that actions against offending states are monitored and have the desired impact.

In addition to reinforcing internal structures, the AU and regional blocs must look toward ensuring that sanctions are strategically targeted to sidestep collateral damage to citizens and gain the cooperation of neighboring states. In essence, the AU needs to recalibrate its response mechanism to prioritize the common interest in maintaining democratic governance over individual state strategies that undermine collective goals.

The urgency of these reforms is underscored by the recurrence of military coups that threaten the stability and development prospects of the continent as it grapples with issues of governance, security, and human rights.